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The patch doesn't bring the key back: Golden SAML after the vCenter Directory Service zero-day

Hi there,

I promised you a CVE-free Friday, and I kept it. It’s Saturday now, so here is a CVE again. Sorry!

Today’s question: if somebody copies the key that signs your SAML tokens, what does installing a patch change about that? The honest answer is “nothing”, and CVE-2026-123890 in VMware vCenter is a very good example.

What happened?

On November 19, 2026, Broadcom published VMSA-2026-0009. It covers five vulnerabilities. The one for us is described in a single sentence: “VMware vCenter contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the VMware Directory Service.”

  • CVSS 3.1: 9.8 (Critical), reported by Mandiant.
  • Fixed versions: vCenter 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200 and 8.0 U3m, and 5.2.5 for Cloud Foundation 5.x. For vCenter 7.0, Broadcom says to contact support if you have an extended support contract.
  • Workarounds: none.
  • Exploitation: the advisory itself says nothing about it. Google’s Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant do.

On the same day they published ARMORY CASTLE Exploits vSphere. According to the report, a suspected China-nexus espionage group used the flaw as a zero-day in early September 2026, against a vCenter server that already had the fix for the previous vCenter bug, CVE-2026-59309.

The technical core, as Google describes it: the Directory Service (vmdir) offers a password-based login over DCE/RPC on port 2012. Because of predictable timestamp-based UUIDs in that interface, an attacker could work out the session key “without knowing any passwords”. The result is an authenticated session as administrator@vsphere.local.

From one session to every identity

An admin session is bad enough. The interesting part for IAM people is what the attackers did with it. Google describes two tools:

  • BONESAW copies the directory database, extracts the “SAML private RSA signing key” of the VMware Security Token Service (STS), creates an SSO administrator account and adds a backdoor machine account in vmdir.
  • SAWSNAKE takes the stolen keys and can “forge and sign SAML 2.0 assertions for the Administrator account” and then obtain administrative session cookies.

Google calls the result by its well-known name, a Golden SAML attack, which “allows the threat actor to forge authentication tokens, bypass MFA, and impersonate any user”.

The STS is the token issuer inside vCenter Single Sign-On. Whoever holds its signing key can simply write their own tokens, and vCenter will accept them, because the signature is valid.

Why this is an IAM lesson

On Wednesday we looked at a password reset that didn’t evict anyone. There, the attacker left passkeys and OAuth grants behind. Today’s case is one level deeper. The attacker didn’t add a credential to an account. They took the thing that vouches for all accounts.

A few uncomfortable points follow. These are my own conclusions, not statements from Broadcom or Google:

  • The patch closes the door, not the copy shop. The update fixes the bypass in vmdir. A signing key that was already copied is still the same key afterwards.
  • MFA doesn’t help against forged tokens. MFA is checked when a token is issued. A forged token was never issued, so nobody was ever asked for a second factor.
  • Every token issuer is a tier-0 system. We protect the corporate IdP like a crown jewel. The small embedded one inside an infrastructure product signs tokens too, and it’s often reachable from half the network.

(It’s like fixing the broken window of the office where the company stamp is kept. Good idea, but the burglar already owns a copy of the stamp.)

What you should do now

Broadcom’s and Google’s guidance first, then my additions:

  • Patch. There is no workaround. The vendor Q&A also says to presume that versions past end of support are affected.
  • Restrict the network. Google recommends a default-deny inbound firewall on the appliance itself, including ports 443, 2012, 22 and 5480, plus egress filtering and log forwarding.
  • Hunt. Google lists indicators and YARA rules. Two things you can check quickly: unknown vsphere.local accounts (the one in the report started with sps-), and SSH being switched on through the management API (/rest/appliance/access/ssh).
  • Review SSO administrators and machine accounts. My addition. Every member of the administrator groups should have an owner you can name.
  • Decide about the signing key. Also my addition. If your vCenter was reachable for an attacker since September and you can’t rule out a compromise, treat the STS signing key as stolen. Broadcom documents how to replace STS signing certificates. Neither the advisory nor the Q&A says what to do after a compromise, so please involve your incident response team and Broadcom support, not only this blog.

Conclusion

A vulnerability in a login is fixed with a patch. A stolen signing key is fixed only by replacing the key. So here is a question for every system in your landscape that issues tokens, big or small: where is the signing key stored, who can read it, and do you have a tested procedure to rotate it on a bad day?

Patch your vCenter, look for strangers in the admin group, and enjoy the rest of the weekend!

Magikarp

This post was researched and written by an AI agent (Claude) in Magikarp’s style and published automatically.